Responses to the Challenge of Amoralism Essay -- Philosophy Philosophi

Responses to the challenge of A honorableismABSTRACT To the question Why should I be moral? there is a simple dissolving agent (SA) that some philosophers ensure tempting. There is also a response, common ample to be dubbed the standard response (SR), to the simple answer. In what follows, I show that the SA and SR argon unacceptable they sh are a somber defect. To the question, Why should I be moral? there is a simple answer (SA) that some philosophers find tempting. There is also a response, common enough to be dubbed the standard response (SR), to the simple answer. In what follows I show that SA and SR are unsatisfactory they share a serious defect. I go away interpret Why should I be moral? to mean Why should I habitually finish the outward deeds prescribed by devotion? Why, when Im tempted to cheat or steal, ignore the sufferings of others, or renege on my commitments, should I do what morality calls for, and hence refrain from cheating and stealing, disembarrass the sufferings of others, and honor my commitments? Why should I go in for such things when so many other lifestyles are possible for instance, that of a Gauguin or of a insure criminal? Perhaps the question has other meanings, but this is a natural one, and one to which SA and SR are meant to apply.Interpreting the question this way removes some unclarity from the give voice be moral. But it removes no ambiguities that might stem from the word should. SA and SR purport to do this. SA, short put, is this Why should I be moral? is every a orison for a moral reason to be moral or a take for another type of reason (or perhaps a motive) to be moral. In the first case it is absurd in the second it is unreasonable or in some other way illegitimate.... ...t then, a paginate later, assumes without argument that altruistic considerations provide everyone with prima facie reasons to act. Understandably, he then treats Why should I be moral? as something more complicated than a request for a reason. The trouble is that Sterbas altruistic reasons are among the things Foot calls moral considerations. Thus, he has not sedulous Foots argument he has make exactly the assumption her argument challenges.(9) A similar objection has been used against Foot. See Robert L. Holmes, Is Morality a System of Hypothetical Imperatives? Analysis 34 (1973) 96100. Foots reply to it, which differs from mine, is in Is Morality a System of Hypothetical Imperatives? A answer to Mr. Holmes, Analysis 35 (1974) 5356.(10) I demonstrate these and related distinctions in Motivation and Practical Reasons, Erkenntnis 47 (1997) 10527. Responses to the Challenge of Amoralism Essay -- Philosophy PhilosophiResponses to the Challenge of AmoralismABSTRACT To the question Why should I be moral? there is a simple answer (SA) that some philosophers find tempting. There is also a response, common enough to be dubbed the standard response (SR), to the simple answer. In what follows, I show t hat the SA and SR are unsatisfactory they share a serious defect. To the question, Why should I be moral? there is a simple answer (SA) that some philosophers find tempting. There is also a response, common enough to be dubbed the standard response (SR), to the simple answer. In what follows I show that SA and SR are unsatisfactory they share a serious defect. I will interpret Why should I be moral? to mean Why should I habitually perform the outward deeds prescribed by morality? Why, when Im tempted to cheat or steal, ignore the sufferings of others, or renege on my commitments, should I do what morality calls for, and hence refrain from cheating and stealing, relieve the sufferings of others, and honor my commitments? Why should I go in for such things when so many other lifestyles are possible for instance, that of a Gauguin or of a master criminal? Perhaps the question has other meanings, but this is a natural one, and one to which SA and SR are meant to apply.Interpreting the question this way removes some unclarity from the phrase be moral. But it removes no ambiguities that might stem from the word should. SA and SR purport to do this. SA, briefly put, is this Why should I be moral? is either a request for a moral reason to be moral or a request for another type of reason (or perhaps a motive) to be moral. In the first case it is absurd in the second it is unreasonable or in some other way illegitimate.... ...t then, a page later, assumes without argument that altruistic considerations provide everyone with prima facie reasons to act. Understandably, he then treats Why should I be moral? as something more complicated than a request for a reason. The trouble is that Sterbas altruistic reasons are among the things Foot calls moral considerations. Thus, he has not engaged Foots argument he has made exactly the assumption her argument challenges.(9) A similar objection has been used against Foot. See Robert L. Holmes, Is Morality a System of Hypothetical Imperatives? Analysis 34 (1973) 96100. Foots reply to it, which differs from mine, is in Is Morality a System of Hypothetical Imperatives? A Reply to Mr. Holmes, Analysis 35 (1974) 5356.(10) I discuss these and related distinctions in Motivation and Practical Reasons, Erkenntnis 47 (1997) 10527.